Rethinking Animal Ethics in Appropriate Context: How Rolston's Work Can Help

Abstract

Holmes Rolston has long been regarded as a leading figure both in environmental philosophy and in science and religion. In this chapter, though, I argue that Rolston’s work also paves the way towards rethinking animal ethics. Given the well-known hostility between many forms of environmental philosophy and animal ethics, to turn to Rolston—a notorious champion of the former field—in order to advance work in the latter field, may seem singularly perverse. But, I will maintain, Rolston’s arguments— whilst undeveloped and in some respects problematic—provide a better basis for advancing work in animal ethics than the advocacy or rejection of utilitarian or rights positions that have dominated animal ethics for several decades. In particular, I will suggest, Rolston’s work provides tools for thinking through the complicated location of domesticated animals both conceptually and ethically. So, at the end of the chapter, I make some initial moves in outlining how Rolston’s position might be developed to contribute to new thinking with respect to animals and ethics. In focusing on the place of animals in Rolston’s environmental ethics, I will touch only obliquely on the area of his work that has caused most controversy: his endorsement of a theory of objective intrinsic value in nature. That topic has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere, and I will not revisit that discussion here. The place of animals in Rolston’s work is not, though, entirely virgin territory either. Some attention has been paid to it before (notably by Peter Wenz [1989], to which Rolston responded, and later by Ned Hettinger [1994] and Moriarty and Woods [1997]). But my interest takes a somewhat different trajectory to that of existing debates, concentrating on Rolston’s understanding of nature and culture as part of the architecture of a context-oriented approach to animal ethics. In order to develop this argument, I will begin by outlining—in a very basic way—what seem to be some central problems in what we might call “philosophical animal liberation” approaches to animal ethics. Then I will move on to draw out key aspects of Rolston’s understanding of “nature” and “culture”. I will consider how animals are located within these categories, and then make some suggestions as to how Rolston’s position might contribute to a more contextual approach to animal ethics. Two further initial comments should be made for clarification. First, in using the term “animals”, I intend to confine my discussion to non-human mammals and birds. Second, I will be assuming—as does Rolston—that, on grounds of sentience at least, it makes sense to talk about these animals as being morally considerable (no stronger claim, such as that animals have rights, is intended). I will not be putting forward arguments to defend the moral considerability of these animals here.