Retailer-manufacturer partnerships in E-commerce: Dual product strategy and market share dynamics

Abstract

A new practice among online retail platforms, e.g., Amazon and Wayfair, is to offer their own private label product and a substitutable exclusive manufacturer product. We employ a game theoretic approach to examine conditions under which a retailer and a manufacturer find it optimal to enter into such a partnership. Our analysis reveals that a retailer finds it profitable to partner with a manufacturer with one of two profiles. The first is a manufacturer with low unit production and holding costs and large capacity, and the retailer gives the manufacturer most of the market share. In this case, the retailer uses a low private product price and marketing effort to pressure the manufacturer to set a low exclusive product price, which increases the manufacturer's revenue and the retailer's fees. The second is a manufacturer with a large consumer base, high unit production and holding costs, and small capacity. For this profile, the retailer takes most of the market share by offering a low private product price, and the manufacturer is unable to counteract the retailer's low private product price and marketing effort. The partnership results in a lower price when the marketing effort is costly and the retailer relies on private product price, intensifying price competition. Under some conditions, the retailer's profit may decrease in his share of the manufacturer's revenue. Also, the retailer may increase the marketing effort and decrease the private product price, not to take market share, but to pressure the manufacturer to decrease price.