Retail Assortment Planning Under Category Captainship

Abstract

Retail assortment planning can have a tremendous impact on a retailer's bottom-line performance. Over the past years, retailers have increasingly relied on their leading manufacturers for recommendations regarding the assortment to be offered to the consumers in a particular category, a practice often referred to as category captainship. Our research investigates the consequences of using category captains for assortment selection decisions. We develop a game-theoretic model where multiple manufacturers sell their products to consumers through a single retailer. We compare a model where the retailer selects the assortment in the category with a model where the retailer relies on a category captain for assortment decisions in return for a target category profit. We show that category captainship can, in some circumstances, benefit not only the retailer and the category captain, but also the noncaptain manufacturers. Our results have implications regarding the implementation of category captainship practices.