Restructuring Strategic Maritime Interests and Blockade Politics in the Indian Ocean

Abstract

China Pakistan Economic Corridor commences its original intent and purpose once it ventures beyond the shores of Gwadar. Alongside this crucial yet strategically well-placed harbor lies a significant array of other ports and maritime interests connected to the Strait of Hormuz. Within this framework, Gulf and the Middle East have observed both CPEC and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with quiet concern, hypothesizing what can be termed 'Blockade Politics.' The main idea behind this manoeuvre would be to assess contending nations' maritime potential and naval prowess in their ability to enforce or counteract a naval blockade. It implies that, like the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz might also posture aggressive economic and military traffic, causing it to incite friction in national interest preservation. For Pakistan, having to develop Gwadar and, subsequently, more port regions adjoining this maritime domain, instituting mutualization of economic interests is an uphill task. Beyond economic integration, however, having to revisit its naval doctrines and upgrade its naval potential will also be a prerequisite for synchronizing with contending parties. This paper analyses a comprehensive assessment of Pakistan's contemporary maritime challenges against the backdrop of CPEC. It also takes impetus in evaluating core requirements to address blockade politics and counter-blockade dispositions that might arise in Gulf, the Middle East, and other sections connected within the Indian Ocean. The study results highlight the significance of modernization and the induction of new naval platforms and doctrines. It also postulates the importance of strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China in creating favorable grounds to address challenges and vulnerabilities.