Abstract
This paper is focused on the analysis, in the framework of lattice theory, of the matchings obtained from restabilization (after disruption) of stable matchings. When the disruption is due to entry workers or closure of firms the unemployed workers make offers to firms. The stable matching obtained is the firms-worst stable matching of the set of stable matchings that the firms weakly prefer to the initial stable matching (i.e., before being disrupted by changes in the population). More precisely, their position within the lattice of stable matchings is shown.
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