Response‐Dependent Theories

Abstract

Abstract We need not doubt the sincerity or linguistic competence of someone in order to think that some of her moral – or other normative or evaluative – views are in error. This seems to support the idea that some evaluative properties are objective. On the other hand, it is hard to understand how there could be evaluative properties “out there,” independent of human sensibilities. There have been many philosophical attempts to account for our thinking and talking about evaluative and moral matters in ways that seem characteristic of objective domains while retaining the link to human sensibility. Some of these attempts do not straightforwardly accept the existence of any objective evaluative properties ( see Quasi‐Realism). However, the strategy of response‐dependent theories takes its point of departure from a comparison between evaluative properties and secondary qualities such as colors. The color of an object is plausibly regarded as an objective matter of fact. However, this need not force us to think of color properties as completely mind‐independent. Rather, we can think of color properties as powers to produce certain visual experiences in a certain class of observers under certain conditions. And it can be an objective matter whether a given object does or does not have such a power.