Response to Teiwes

Abstract

Jam deeply flattered that Pacific Affairs has chosen my book to be the subject of a review essay, and that Frederick Teiwes both agreed to review the book and obviously put so much effort into his essay. Teiwes and Roderick MacFarquhar are the true masters of China's elite political history prior to the Cultural Revolution, and Teiwes' assessment carries great weight. Obviously, all authors hope their readers will find their books to be brilliant, works which prompt fundamental rethinking of approaches to the relevant subject matter. Short of that, authors hope their readers will take their work seriously, and that out of the dialogue between serious scholars, further progress towards the truth will emerge. Teiwes has certainly taken my work seriously, and I hope that further understanding develops from this response to his review essay. My book has two aims. The first is to show that major elements of the economic policies associated with the Great Leap Forward were not Maoist in origin, but rather were formulated by top economic planners both to serve bureaucratic interests and to counter reforms put forward by another group of economic officials that undermined the basis of planningheavy industry control of China's political economy. I argue in the specific context of 1956-1957 that the Chinese political agenda was bifurcated, with Mao Zedong and most other leaders focusing on political issues, and economic officials concentrating on economic affairs. While this agenda bifurcation was unusual, I argue that for a variety of reasons, Mao's lack of interest in and inability to control fully macroeconomic issues in China was not. The second, larger aim of my book is to try to demonstrate the utility of a neo-institutional to understanding much of China's political economy and, particularly, its propensity for leaps and retreats. While Teiwes and I have a number of disagreements, I would like to focus on four. One obvious area concerns the role of Mao Zedong. Another is the merits of a new institutional approach to Chinese politics. The third is the nature of the Great Leap Forward. The fourth is the nature of the relationships among the leading Chinese economic officials in the mid 1950s. I think our views on Mao are more similar than Teiwes' essay suggests. I agree that Mao's position in the Chinese political process was unparalleled, and that Mao had the right of ultimate decision in Chinese politics. Despite this, I reaffirm my belief that Mao's Hundred Flowers policy was seen by his colleagues as a blunder to a greater or lesser degree, and that Mao lost