Response to Lechner: Recent Religious Declines in Quebec, Poland, and the Netherlands: A Theory Vindicated

Abstract

How ironic that this article by Frank Lechner should arrive just as we prepared to write an essay arguing that recent religious changes in Quebec, Poland, and the Netherlands are extremely consistent with our theory of religious markets. It is even more ironic that one important source for this study was Lechner's own excellent work (1989) on the collapse of Dutch Catholicism, wherein he set forth all of the historical facts and much of the analysis needed to reconcile market theory with recent Dutch history. Unfortunately, Lechner is convinced that our theory cannot explain declines in religiousness, thus leaving the secularization doctrine as the only available explanation. The fact is that our theory aims to explain variations in religiousness and therefore must account for the recent changes observed in Quebec, Poland, and the Netherlands. Moreover, Lechner's skillful documentation of the decline of Dutch religions participation highlights aspects of the theory that we have often noted but perhaps have failed to emphasize sufficiently (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark 1992; Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995). Thus, we welcome this opportunity to clarify our views and we offer this reply in lieu of the more extensive essay we originally had planned. Let us begin by restating a few of our fundamental theoretical propositions: 1. Religious commodities are both costly and risky. They demand the sacrifice of valuable resources in return for promised rewards that, in most cases, lie beyond the range of empirical proof. 2. Faced with these costs and risks, religious consumers are tempted to backslide, thereby reducing their levels of participation and commitment. 3. Vigorous marketing by religious organizations is required to overcome the tendency to backslide and to maintain high levels of commitment. 4. To the degree that religious economies lack competition, the dominant firm(s) will be lazy (will not engage in vigorous marketing) and will not generate high levels of commitment to, or participation in, religious organizations. 5. Societies having low levels of commitment and participation also will be lacking in effective religious socialization. 6. Where large numbers of people receive little or no religious socialization, subjective religiousness will tend to be idiosyncratic and heterodox, but will be far more widespread than organized religious participation.