Response to Lawlor, "Navigating a Passage

Abstract

admits passing that Derrida is often, and concerning most crucial matters Husserl's thought, (Lawlor, Navigating, 3). do try to acknowledge what can be acknowledged. Do really admit, even in passing, that Derrida is correct about the most crucial matters Husserl's thought? The more interesting question would be whether admit that Derrida is correct at crucial junctures of his deconstruction. And when one looks at list of admissions, degree to which and sense which admit that Derrida is correct would require serious qualification a number of cases. even admits that Speech and Phenomena contains some arguments. Derrida argues, for instance, that Husserl's notion of absolute consciousness, being temporal, implies that there is no pre-expressive stratum of sense [126] (ibid., 4). don't get this. Absolute consciousness generally is not temporal for Husserl (as note at Strategies, 104). Derrida's own discussion does not really thematize notion of absolute consciousness. It is discussed a footnote (Derrida, SP, 84/94), but it is not systematically introduced at all. Yet, when one comes to conclusions of his book, one finds that he provides no reminder for his readers that these admissions have been made. He never reminds his readers of arguments' soundness; he never reminds his readers of how often Derrida says something true. Instead, conclusion leaves impression that Evans believes that and SP particular amount to nothing more than a executed parody of classical philosophical rigor [172-73]. The omission of such a reminder, an omission that moreover contradicts Evans's explicit intention to remain open to Derridean challenge [xviii], makes integrity of this book (ibid.; references are to Strategies of Deconstruction). Let's move backwards. never assert that deconstruction general is good, bad, or indifferent. Quite opposite, am explicitly open to possibility that other deconstructive texts do a better job than find Speech and Phenomena and Of Grammatology doing. also never assert-nor, think, do leave an impression-that Speech and Phenomena is a poorly executed parody of classical philosophical rigor. do make something of a big deal of considering Scanlon's (itself thoroughly tongue-in-cheek) suggestion that Speech and Phenomena is sophisticated parody. If critical results of my book stand, then think that my leaning over backward to consider possibility that Speech and Phenomena is a parody is sort of funny. One can reject that condition, of course. As for charge that never remind my readers of all sound arguments Derrida presents, first place, don't accept all of those arguments Lawlor mentions, as a look at Strategies will show. In second place, when summed up results of my study of Speech and Phenomena Conclusion, concentrated, with complete justice think, on Derrida's attempt at a radical of Husserl's phenomenology. Assuming, once again, that my criticisms of Derrida's readings, interpretations, and arguments, are cogent, news is what goes wrong, news is again and again (always assuming that am right) that Derrida's reading/argument/interpretation, when read carefully, fails to live up to its own standards and thus fails to establish its results. would find it difficult to imagine a reader who, at end of Strategies, thinks I don't know yet if Evans is right his claims, since haven't yet gone back to Husserl's and Derrida's texts to check out his claims, but even if he is right claims he makes reading of SP, can already assert that this is a book of questionable integrity. But think that it is what Lawlor is saying challenging integrity of my book. Defending Husserl first tries to defend Husserl against Derrida's charge of logocentrism (Lawlor, Navigating, 4). …