Response to Fumerton, Marti, Reimer and Stroud

Abstract

Magic tantalizes and at same time gives off scent of sham. Two of papers collected here take up challenge of magic, fact that words (as opposed to other natural objects) mean, that words stand for things. I begin with those two papers, one by Barry Stroud, who I count as a kindred spirit, other by Richard Fumerton, who represents loyal opposition.1 Stroud begins by delineating two major themes in my book. First, I seek to criticize a traditional approach to language that sees application of words, proper names for example, as supervening on mind's grasp of referent. I call this the cognitive fix requirement. It is maintained by many Frege, Russell, and their followers for example and in a variety of forms. An elementary survey of actual practice, I argue in my book, puts cognitive fix idea at great risk. The cognitive fix requirement reflects a deeper philosophical tendency, what I call in Chapter 3, linguistic Cartesianism. For Cartesian thought is prior to language in any number of respects, and it is this priority that is supposed to explain magic, what Wittgenstein speaks of as peculiar vitality of language; that symbols have a kind of life for us that rocks do not. I see in early direct literature not only a frontal assault on cognitive fix idea but also suggestion of a radical departure from Cartesian perspective. In idea of 'direct' reference, writes Stroud, reference without cognitive intermediaries, Wettstein sees promise of an end to 'linguistic Cartesianism' once and for all. Once and for all.... I chuckled at virtually messianic thought. My aim was hardly to finish off my opponent view is deeply entrenched but to lay out my alternative and explain its attractions.