Abstract
What makes a certain consideration an aesthetic reason rather than a reason of some other kind? Is it a solely a matter of the kind of attitude or activity that the reason supports? How fundamental or structural are such reasons? Do they contrast in a natural way with epistemic or practical reasons? Is skilled aesthetic achievement, whether interpretative or creative, a matter of recognizing the aesthetic reasons we have for a given response, and correctly according with such reasons? In this paper, I offer a preliminary discussion of these topics. I argue that our account of aesthetic reasons should respect the fact that they play an important regulative role, over and above directly supporting aesthetic response. Such a role allows aesthetic reasons to moderate a wide range of practical and epistemic activities, but not by adding or substituting distinctively aesthetic ends or purposes for such activities. I then go on to argue against the view that skilled aesthetic achievement consists in correct recognition of and accord with aesthetic reasons, adapting a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s.
Highlights
What makes a certain consideration an aesthetic reason rather than a reason of some other kind? Is it a solely a matter of the kind of attitude or activity that the reason supports? How fundamental or structural are such reasons? Do they contrast in a natural way with epistemic or practical reasons? Is skilled aesthetic achievement, whether interpretative or creative, a matter of recognizing the aesthetic reasons we have for a given response, and correctly according with such reasons? In this paper, I offer a preliminary discussion of these topics
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Summary
Our focus here will be on normative or justificatory reasons: considerations that count for or against activities or attitudes, and help us normatively appraise them, rather than just causally explaining their occurrence. A simple but attractive model might distinguish (i) epistemic reasons: reasons for belief; (ii) practical reasons: reasons for action; (iii) aesthetic reasons: reasons for appreciation On this view, the distinctions between aesthetic reasons and others are as structural as the distinctions between the attitudes and activities that they are directed towards.. If we thought that these states were quite different from beliefs or actions, but still comparatively practice-independent and suitably universal, we might view aesthetic reasons as belonging to a fairly basic, general, unified normative category. A defender of such a view should want the states in question (i) to be not just beliefs or actions, (ii) to be reason-sensitive, (iii) to be suitably distinctive and unified, and (iv) to be appropriately related to everyday aesthetic talk and practice.
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