Resource theory and ameliorative strategy in a minimal information political convention game

Abstract

Coalition formation literature indicates that strategies more ameliorative than minimum resource theory appear under a variety of conditions of the competitive environment. These conditions include uncertainty of outcome and indivisibility of payoff. Some investigators have hypothesized that the inadequacies of minimum resource theory can be attributed to strong players using a parity norm and weak players using an equality norm in the bargaining process. The present study examines the plausibility of this hypothesis in the initial partner selection stage of the bargaining process phase of decision processes in systems at the small group level. An analytical paradigm is presented for discriminating among four strategic goals in the mixed motive three-person game: maximization, security, intracoalition compatibility, and competition. The last three goals are nonoptimal under minimum resource theory. Some earlier results that relatively indivisible payoffs lead to a greater incidence of nonpay-off-maximizing strategies than expected under minimum resource theory were supported under conditions of play involving indirect interpersonal interaction. The appropriateness of taking resource position alone as the determinant of a norm for strategy selection consequently must be questioned.