Resource Management and Pricing for Cloud Computing Based Mobile Blockchain With Pooling

Abstract

In a public blockchain system applying Proof of Work (PoW), the participants need to compete with their computing resources for reward, which is challenging for resource-limited devices. Mobile blockchain is proposed to facilitate the application of blockchain for mobile service, in which the lightweight devices can participate mining by renting resources from the Cloud Computing Service Provider (CCSP), but CCSP usually does not have the information about the demand preference of users. In this paper, a contract model is adopted to address the cloud computing resource allocation and pricing problem in the mobile blockchain. In particular, an adverse selection contract solution is proposed to overcome the information asymmetry problem, and resource pooling is introduced to improve the stability of users rewards. Simulation results show that the information asymmetry problem is well overcome by adverse selection contract so that CCSP can obtain more utility than linear pricing contracts. Furthermore, the resource pooling could effectively improve the users and CCSPs utilities. When the size of the mining pool is large enough, it can achieve an improvement effect of more than 10 times. The effect of pool size and user type distribution on CCSPs utility is also studied.