Abstract
Information problems impede private contracting for the supply of many natural resource services. They are also likely to prevent the government identifying and achieving optimum levels of natural resource degradation on agricultural land. In particular, the distributional impacts of government intervention create incentives for strategic distortions of information by interested parties. Resource conservation measures which impose costs on beneficiaries, and which provide positive incentives for farmers to monitor resource degradation, may be superior because they reduce information problems.
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