Resource Curse or Governance Deficit? The Role of Parliament in Uganda’s Oil and Zimbabwe’s Diamonds

Abstract

This article returns to the question of ‘resource curse’ and the powers of local parliaments to harness resource exploitation to meet national development agendas. The study is inspired by direct experiences with the Zimbabwean and Ugandan parliaments. It examines the dilemmas and uncertainties that confront dysfunctional states, and states with weak governance institutions, in governing newly discovered natural resources effectively. It focuses on the experiences of parliament in Uganda after the discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in the Albertine Graben region and in Zimbabwe following the discovery of diamonds in Chiadzwa, both in 2006. In both countries, parliament has frantically tried to carve out space for national dialogue on, and transparent mechanisms for, the governance and control of the natural resources. Yet, in both cases, we describe an opaque terrain, where gross corrupt deals and underhand transactions can be processed without regulation. Parliament has tried, but failed, to play a critical role in oil and diamond governance. We conclude that the ‘resource curse’ is more a reflection of a governance deficit than a resource abundance crisis.