Resource Complementarity vs. Absorptive Capacity: The Governance of International Scientific Teams

Abstract

This article explains and demonstrates how formal (contracts) and relational governance mechanisms influence the relationship between resource complementarity and absorptive capacity to enhance the performance of R&D international cooperation projects. We proposed a theoretical model regarding the moderating effects of customized contracts and relational mechanisms of governance (trust, shared objectives, and communication) on the relationships between resource complementarity (human, organizational, physical, and financial resources) and absorptive capacity (potential and achieved). The model was tested empirically through structural equation modeling, by using the maximum likelihood method for estimating the parameters. The sample consisted of 231 R&D projects of international cooperation in agricultural sciences, involving Brazilian and international institutions. In the presence of less customized contracts, the exchange of complementary resources extends the teams' absorptive capacity. We also found that there is a need of well-established relational mechanisms for resource complementarity to affect the absorptive capacity. In the joint action of governance mechanisms, less customized contracts of R&D projects increase the exchange of complementary resources, besides enhancing trust, aligning the goals of team members, and fostering progress in the communication with external partners. The results provide important information for managers and leaders of research programs and projects, regarding the use of governance mechanisms to enhance teams’ absorptive capacity through complementary resources. The study increases knowledge on the interaction of formal and relational mechanisms to enhance absorptive capacity, which has been little explored in previous research.