Abstract
Combining an agency perspective, a resource-based view and upper echelon research, this paper examines inter-links between executive characteristics, board structure and share ownership, and short-term performance of firms in a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the UK. It argues that the IPO process presents a unique combination of agency relationships between the firm's executive and non-executive directors, IPO's advisors and underwriters, and outside investors. Board structure, diversity and ownership may be used strategically by the IPO's team to reduce potential agency costs. It shows that, in line with the predictions of a proposed theoretical model, board diversity and share ownership of non-executive directors are negatively associated with experience and share ownership of executive directors. Board diversity and executive share ownership are associated with better IPO performance measured in terms of share offer 'underpricing'.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
