Abstract

Working together on complex collaborative tasks requires agents to coordinate their actions. Doing this explicitly or completely prior to the actual interaction is not always possible nor sufficient. Agents also need to continuously understand the current actions of others and quickly adapt their own behavior appropriately. Here we investigate how efficient, automatic coordination processes at the level of mental states (intentions, goals), which we call belief resonance, can lead to collaborative situated problem-solving. We present a model of hierarchical active inference for collaborative agents (HAICA). It combines efficient Bayesian Theory of Mind processes with a perception–action system based on predictive processing and active inference. Belief resonance is realized by letting the inferred mental states of one agent influence another agent’s predictive beliefs about its own goals and intentions. This way, the inferred mental states influence the agent’s own task behavior without explicit collaborative reasoning. We implement and evaluate this model in the Overcooked domain, in which two agents with varying degrees of belief resonance team up to fulfill meal orders. Our results demonstrate that agents based on HAICA achieve a team performance comparable to recent state-of-the-art approaches, while incurring much lower computational costs. We also show that belief resonance is especially beneficial in settings where the agents have asymmetric knowledge about the environment. The results indicate that belief resonance and active inference allow for quick and efficient agent coordination and thus can serve as a building block for collaborative cognitive agents.

Highlights

  • This includes an explanation of an efficient Theory of Mind (ToM) approach that we propose to use in hierarchical active inference for collaborative agents (HAICA)

  • The results show that all agent teams always succeed in preparing just the Tomato salad, except those using the HAICA model without belief resonance (SP = 0)

  • Regarding the order in which information is integrated during belief resonance, we find that performance is a lot worse for all but only small susceptibility parameter (SP) values when the inferred other-beliefs are integrated into self-beliefs last

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Summary

Introduction

When preparing a meal together in a kitchen, agents need to coordinate to determine sub-tasks for each agent or for jointly working on a sub-task when necessary Often this requires explicit coordination prior to task execution, e.g., through jointly planning and negotiating sub-tasks. We manage to work together even without prior experience or fixed social roles [1, 2] This is possible because, despite a lack of direct access to other agents’ minds, from a young age we are able to perceive the actions of other agents and form hypotheses about their current intentional state (action intentions, plans, or goals) or epistemic-attentional state (beliefs, assumptions, perceptions) [3]. We are able to recognize and predict another agent’s actions and motor intentions [5] by way of resonance processes that involve our own motor system in our perception of others [6]

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