Resolving the Legitimacy Problems: A Case Study of the Shooting in Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election

Abstract

Resolving Legitimacy Problems: A Case Study of the Shooting in Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election Tzu-Wen Sung Fierce debate continues over Taiwan's 2004 presidential election. The election-eve shooting of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu is the pivotal factor in these discussions. Most analyses of the shooting incident have been more focussed on inferring the truth about this criminal case, and debate about whether or not the incumbent president benefited from this shooting.1 However, when solving a criminal case without significant and direct evidence, any hypothetic deductive logic is just one possibility. The opposition, which lost the presidential election by 0.2 per cent of the vote, accused the incumbent bloc of using the shooting incident to mislead voters into sympathising with Chen Shui-bian.2 These contentions inevitably caused the legitimacy of the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election results to be questioned. The concept of legitimacy contrasts with the concept of legality. As a great deal of the classic literature in politics and jurisprudence has already discussed these concepts, no attempt is made in this article to discuss them in detail. The focus here is on forward-looking thinking — how to reduce the possibility that any such incident like the 2004 election-eve shooting could occur in the future.3 The article begins by considering the normative aspect: Should any legitimacy be given to the outcome of the presidential election? Then the positive aspect is examined: How do we redeem the legitimacy of the presidential election results? How do we avert doubts about the legitimacy of future presidential elections? Accordingly, the specific purposes of this article are: firstly, to show the difficulty in resolving the current dissension [End Page 335] over the legitimacy of the 2004 Taiwanese presidential election results during the process of seeking answers for the normative and positive questions; and secondly, to remind researchers of the importance of the forward-looking aspect of this serious issue. Methodology The focus here is on the benchmark approach abstracted from Ronald Coase by Bingyuang Hsiung.4 Coase's approach can be summarised as follows: setting a reference point, treating this point as a benchmark and then comparing and contrasting this benchmark with the selected topics. Hsiung also suggests: "When we apply the benchmark approach, we have to consider why to choose this benchmark point but not the others."5 In economics, benefit and cost are mentioned in the same breath, and cost-benefit analysis is also a useful tool in many studies. For example, if the expected benefits of a specific policy are greater than the expected costs, then implementing the policy will add to total social welfare. Nonetheless, the benefit of Taiwan's presidential election results without legitimacy problems may not be easy to measure. For individuals, the benefits of legitimacy are highly subjective. When the outcome of an election is legitimate, some people may be quite satisfied with it, but others may not care. How can we compare, for different people, the degree of benefit in having no legitimacy problem; or how can we use a measurable [End Page 336] index to make comparisons? Even if some indirect measurements are used, the results of comparison may not be clear. When the outcome of an election lacks legitimacy and needs resolution, using the concept of costs is clear and objective. In the case of the 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, if a re-vote is one method to redeem its legitimacy, then the functional expenses that Taiwan's Central Election Commission (CEC) would pay for holding the re-vote is a definite cost. If a multi-party political consultation is another method to redeem the legitimacy of the presidential election results, then the resources that the two rival blocs need to invest in the consultation are measurable costs. For instance, each bloc may need to hold its own plenary session to reach common consent, and the two blocs...