Abstract

The results of econometric modeling are fragile in the sense that minor changes in estimation techniques or sample can lead to statistical models that support inconsistent causal hypotheses. The fragility of econometric results undermines making conclusive inferences from the empirical literature. I argue that the program of evidential pluralism, which originated in the context of medicine and encapsulates to the normative reading of the Russo-Williamson Thesis that causal claims need the support of both difference-making and mechanistic evidence, offers a ground for resolving empirical disagreements. I analyze a recent econometric controversy regarding the tax elasticity of cigarette consumption and smoking intensity. Both studies apply plausible estimation techniques but report inconsistent results. I show that mechanistic evidence allows for discriminating econometric models representing genuine causal relations from accidental dependencies in data. Furthermore, I discuss the differences between biological and social mechanisms and mechanistic evidence across the disciplines. I show that economists mainly rely on mathematical models to represent possible mechanisms (i.e., mechanisms that could produce a phenomenon of interest). Still, claiming the actuality of the represented mechanisms requires establishing that crucial assumptions of these models are descriptively adequate. I exemplify my approach to assessing the quality of mechanistic evidence in economics with an analysis of two models of rational addiction.

Highlights

  • According to Russo and Williamson (2007), establishing causality requires both difference-making and mechanistic evidence

  • The example of the controversy regarding estimating tax elasticity of cigarette consumption and smoking intensity instantiates a general problem with causal inference based on statistical models

  • Evidential pluralism, which encapsulates to the normative reading of the Russo-Williamson Thesis that causal claims require both difference-making and mechanistic evidence offers an additional constraint for distinguishing between genuinely causal and purely correlational results

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Summary

Introduction

According to Russo and Williamson (2007), establishing causality requires both difference-making and mechanistic evidence. The arguments of philosophers supporting evidential pluralism as a plausible approach to causal inference in economics are either descriptive or normative. Çağlar Dede (2019) analyzed the evidentiary base for Incentivized Smoking Cessation Policies (these include, but are not limited to, supporting quitting smokers with small financial rewards) and argued that considering the results of different types of research being evidence of different types improves the quality of behavioral public policies Such arguments are opposed with counterexamples showing that economists put forward causal conclusions based on a single type of evidence. Prediction, which is one of the goals of econometrics, does not require mechanistic evidence (see Reiss, 2007) While these examples undermine taking evidential pluralism as a view descriptively adequate to how causal inferences are drawn in the discipline, they do not weaken evidential pluralism considered a normative position. The case study shows that the approach of evidential pluralism is useful when methodologically-sound statistical models are in disagreement

The malleability of econometric modeling
Estimating the influence of excise tax on smoking intensity
Mechanistic evidence in economics
Models of rational addiction
Findings
Concluding remarks
Full Text
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