Resolution of evolutionary conflict: a general theory and its applications

Abstract

While many cases in which conflict over the evolution of social behavior exists even between closely related individuals (e.g., parent-offspring conflict) have been pointed out, little attention has been paid on the problem of where such conflict should lead. A general theory of conflict resolution, however, has recently been developed. The key idea of the theory is the incorporation of conflict costs in the inclusive fitness evaluation. The theory shows that if both sides engaged in the conflict can potentially control the other at a cost, the coevolutionary game of escalating the fight with increased conflict costs always leads either side to give in to the other, resolving the conflict. Here we examine the logical basis of the theory in terms of a simplest example, donor-recipient conflict over the evolution of altruism, and to show its different types of application we review two more specific examples: reproductive-worker conflict over true (sterile) worker evolution in termites and insider-outsider conflict over group size determination. The latter exemplifies the resolution of conflict over the value of a variable (group size in this case) rather than a behavior, suggesting extended applicability of the basic theory.