Abstract
A novel approach to dual decision making is suggested. The basic notion is the behavioral probability of an event, which consists of two terms. One of the terms defines the probability of the event based on the rational estimation of utility. While the other term takes into account irrational processes in decision making. The sum of these terms is the behavioral probability taking into account the rational-irrational duality of decision making. Despite that the term characterizing irrational corrections is random, its non-informative prior can be estimated, which makes it possible to predict, without any fitting parameters, the average ratio of decision makers taking the corresponding decisions. It is shown that the well known paradoxes in behavioral decision making, such as Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox, Kahneman-Tversky paradox, conjunction fallacy, disjunction effect, prisoner dilemma, and Ariely paradox, find natural explanations in the frame of the suggested dual decision theory.
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