Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice

Michael Doan

doi:10.5206/fpq/2018.4.6230

Abstract

What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and ongoing political struggles. Recent work in the theory of recognition—particularly the work of critical, feminist, and decolonial theorists—can help to identify and correct the shortcomings of these approaches. I offer a critical appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three characteristics of Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of political struggles. I propose that a theory of epistemic injustice can better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of such struggles by acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions.

Highlights

What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can historical and contemporary political struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination1 that seek to
I offer a critical appraisal of recent conversation concerning epistemic injustice, focusing on three characteristics of currently dominant, Frickerian frameworks that obscure the epistemic dimensions of political struggles and conflicts
Drawing on a shared analysis of how community groups in Detroit and Flint are advancing common struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right (Howell, Doan, and Harbin 2017), I propose that one way a theory of epistemic injustice can better illuminate the epistemic dimensions of political struggles is by acknowledging and centering the agency of victims in abusive epistemic relations, by conceptualizing the harms and wrongs of epistemic injustice relationally, and by explaining epistemic injustice as rooted in the oppressive and dysfunctional epistemic norms undergirding actual communities and institutions

Summary

Introduction

What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can historical and contemporary political struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination1 that seek to Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol 4, Iss. 4, Article 5 improve practices of knowledge production for the sake of making lives more liveable?Answering these questions involves attending to the particularities of distinct places, each with their own complex histories and social dynamics.

Results

Conclusion