Resilient pursuit evasion guidance with feedback game strategy

Abstract

This paper proposed a resilient guidance strategy for planar pursuit evasion, in which the homing guidance problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. As is known, the most salient challenge for pursuit evasion guidance is how to ensure an interception despite both players (i.e., missile and target) actively optimize their own interest with preferably incomplete information. Toward this, we introduce a game-theoretic guidance strategy that effectively integrates incentive feedback strategy into pursuit evasion game. In particular, the proposed resilient guidance law takes the form of Stackelberg game conjecture with missile/interceptor as the designated leader, and rigorously proves that leader's interest can be best served with a properly designed feedback gain, and an interception can be made possible in spite of incomplete knowledge on target's intentions (i.e., performance index). Simulation results verify the performance of the proposed strategy.