Resilient Distributed Secondary Control Strategy for Polymorphic Seaport Microgrid against Estimation-Dependent FDI Attacks

Abstract

This paper investigates the resilient distributed secondary control problem against FDI attacks for the seaport microgrid with a high proportion of renewable energy. Firstly, the polymorphic seaport microgrid containing a power layer, a control layer, a data layer and a service layer is constructed. It can achieve a software-defined function for control strategies based on a layered network and allows heterogeneous distributed generators (DGs) to exchange various types of data packets. Secondly, considering the unbounded attack generated by stolen estimator parameters can rapidly cause a large-scale power outage of the seaport microgrid, an estimation-dependent attack is designed from the perspective of attackers. Furthermore, a resilient distributed secondary control strategy using the virtual network is proposed to defend against the estimation-dependent attack. The virtual layer interconnects with the original control layer in the polymorphic network to generate an attack compensation vector, which can suppress the attack in the control layer. Furthermore, the stability analysis is completed by using the Lyapunov theory. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed strategy is validated by a seaport microgrid test model with six DGs.