Resilient Defense of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids via Virtual Hidden Networks

Abstract

The resilient defence strategy for the False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) from the perspective of structural vulnerability of smart grids, by using graph and cybernetic approaches, is investigated in this paper. FDIA is a kind of well-designed cyber attack that can bypass traditional bad data detection methods and thus cause serious damage to smart grids. To defend against FDIAs, a resilient defence control strategy based on virtual hidden networks is proposed to improve the structural vulnerability of smart grids in this study. Firstly, a reduced-dimensional local consensus dynamic model is derived by Kron reduction method. Secondly, a virtual hidden network interconnected with the grid is constructed and designed by using graph theory to indirectly improve the structural vulnerability of the smart grid. In addition, a competitive interconnection approach based on the network zero-sum game is used to further improve the structural vulnerability of the smart grid. The resilience of the smart grid can be effectively improved by changing the topology of the virtual hidden network and the interconnection bipartite graph. Thirdly, the stability of the virtual hidden network-based defence controller is demonstrated separately under either cases without or with FDIAs. The results show that the addition of the virtual hidden network does not change the steady-state operating point of the original grid, but can effectively mitigate the impact of FDIAs on the smart grid. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated on the IEEE 14-bus grid and on the New England 39-bus grid, respectively.