Resilience-oriented planning strategy for the cyber-physical ADN under malicious attacks

Abstract

With the increasing coupling between the communication network and the power system, malicious cyber-physical attacks pose a serious threat to the security of cyber-physical systems (CPS). Besides the direct failures caused by the attacks on the corresponding systems, the indirect failures caused by the physical attacks on the cyber side are also of concern. Therefore, this paper proposes a resilience-oriented planning strategy for the cyber-physical active distribution network (ADN) under the malicious attacks. The strategy first coordinates the planning of line hardening and signal protection to reduce the size of direct and indirect failures. In addition, the energy consumption of base stations (BSs) in wireless communication networks is adjusted based on communication reliability (CR) to improve the controlled state of resilience resources during the recovery process. Finally, the controllable distributed generations, capacitor banks and soft open points are scheduled considering the response capability differences to ensure the balance of active and reactive power during the emergency response and restoration dispatch. The proposed strategy is modeled as a D-A-Multi-D model. To evaluate the strategy, simulations are implemented on the 33-bus and 123-bus ADNs. The results show that neglecting the impact of indirect failures leads to an underestimation of the unserved load cost of about 21.7% compared to the proposed strategy. Moreover, BS adjustment and temporal recovery processes are more applicable to the resilience enhancement of the ADN.