Abstract
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are critical infrastructure for the welfare of society. Due to their spatial extent and difficulties in deployment of security measures, they are vulnerable to threat scenarios that include the rising concern of cyber-physical attacks. To protect WDNs against different kinds of water contamination, it is customary to deploy water quality (WQ) monitoring sensors. Cyber-attacks on the monitoring system that employs WQ sensors combined with deliberate contamination events via backflow attacks can lead to severe disruptions to water delivery or even potentially fatal consequences for consumers. As such, the water sector is in immediate need of tools and methodologies that can support cyber-physical quality attack simulation and vulnerability assessment of the WQ monitoring system under such attacks. In this study we demonstrate a novel methodology to assess the resilience of placement schemes generated with the Threat Ensemble Vulnerability Assessment and Sensor Placement Optimization Tool (TEVA-SPOT) and evaluated under cyber-physical attacks simulated using the stress-testing platform RISKNOUGHT, using multidimensional metrics and resilience profile graphs. The results of this study show that some sensor designs are inherently more resilient than others, and this trait can be exploited in risk management practices.
Highlights
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are spatially large and complex systems supplying drinking water to consumers by satisfying multiple objectives, such as maintaining adequate hydraulic pressure, storing water for firefighting, maintaining disinfectant residuals to limit microbial regrowth, and minimizing potential harmful concentrations of substances in the water [1]
Of growing interest is the special case of cyber-physical threats in the form of cyber-physical attacks (e.g., [16,17,18,19,20,21]) where, for example, a deliberate contamination event is combined with a cyber-attack on the water quality (WQ) monitoring system of the WDN, usually a sub-system of the main SCADA system
We presented a formal resilience assessment methodology for different water quality sensor designs in cyber-physical water distribution systems under cyber-physical threats
Summary
Water distribution networks (WDNs) are spatially large and complex systems supplying drinking water to consumers by satisfying multiple objectives, such as maintaining adequate hydraulic pressure, storing water for firefighting, maintaining disinfectant residuals to limit microbial regrowth, and minimizing potential harmful concentrations of substances in the water [1]. We use an operational definition where resilience is defined as “the degree to which an urban water system continues to perform under progressively increasing disturbance”, whereas robustness is best defined as “the level of pressure that the system can sustain without failing (or without performance loss)” [43] With this definition, special types of curves, termed “resilience profile graphs,” communicate the performance of the system to meet its objectives on the y-axis as measured by a metric of reliability, whereas on the x-axis ticks lie scenarios of increasing disturbance and is by definition an ordinal scale. This is achieved by coupling two interacting models with feedback loops: (a) the cyber model, a customizable SCADA layer that simulates the control logic and behavior of PLCs, sensors, and actuators, and (b) the physical model, a custom
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
