Reshaping the internet – the impact of the securitisation of internet infrastructure on approaches to internet governance: the case of Russia and the EU

Eva Claessen

doi:10.1080/23738871.2020.1728356

Abstract

ABSTRACT In the face of the rising political stake associated with the Internet, states are increasingly vying for a bigger role in its governance. Within a climate of an array of threats associated with the online information space, the attention is turning towards the governance of the internet infrastructure itself, comprising both the physical (the collection of cables computers, servers and routers that make up the network) and the virtual infrastructure (protocols, social media platforms and search engines that make it possible to navigate and use the internet). The question of sovereignty is not only increasingly reflected in the legislation of political actors like Russia, but also recently in EU discourse in relation to technological resilience and cyber security. This article aims to map out the impact of the securitisation of the internet infrastructure in the Russian and the EU approach to internet governance.

Highlights

Within the context of rising challenges emanating from the online information space, states are increasingly faced with the dilemma of how to provide an adequate response to threats posed in an area that is inherently decentralised and non-hierarchical in its architecture
Within a climate of an array of threats associated with the online information space, the attention is turning towards the governance of the internet infrastructure itself, comprising both the physical and the virtual infrastructure
This article has provided a look into the respective stances on internet governance of Russia and the EU and the increased importance of internet infrastructure in this context

Summary

Introduction

[The European Parliament] recalls that international cooperation is the core instrument for introducing effective cyber-security measures; recognises that at present the EU is not actively involved on an ongoing basis in international cooperation processes and dialogues relating to cyber-security; calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to start a constructive dialogue with all like-minded countries with a view to developing a common understanding and policies with the aim of increasing the resilience of the internet and of critical infrastructure; maintains that, at the same time, the EU should, on a permanent basis, include internet security issues in the scope of its external relations, inter alia when designing various financing instruments or when committing to international agreements which involve the exchange and storage of sensitive data These three changes were further built upon in the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy by clarifying the EU approach towards the protection of the internet. As there is increasing recognition by the EU of the need to ensure ‘strategic autonomy’ or, as it is more recently being called, ‘technological sovereignty’ in cyberspace, it becomes increasingly difficult to balance an ‘open’ approach towards sovereignty in cyberspace with putting forward a normative and legislative framework impacting upon existing internet infrastructure if third parties don’t agree to implement these norms

Conclusion

Notes on contributor