Reshaping institutional arrangements for TPP ratification in Korea

Abstract

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of Korea’s internal negotiation system and the role of domestic policy factors in the process of Korea’s joining the mega FTAs such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).Design/methodology/approach– Along with Putnam’s three determinants of win-set size, the authors analyze a new set of policy factors – including Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), the FTA Domestic Planning Division, and the Trade Procedure Act – to examine the institutional arrangements available for the ratification of the TPP in Korea.Findings– To minimize the social cost of the internal negotiation process of the trade, better understanding of the role of domestic policy factors is essential. The paper proposes some important policy suggestions which will scale up the benefit of the trade.Research limitations/implications– The very same analysis can be easily extended to examine the domestic reactions for future FTA negotiation, especially for Mega FTA negotiation.Practical implications– The authors propose six policy suggestions: a Master Process Manual; measures to diagnose domestic reactions; emphasizing non-economic issues; strengthening human resources; considering the strategic role of the Trade Procedure Act; and reshaping TAA, to ensure that a tranquil environment exists for domestic negotiation and confirmation and the authors believe these policies can be implemented widely in trade negotiations.Originality/value– This paper contributes to the existing literature in at least three respects. First, the authors made the first attempt to integrate the domestic policy tools with the domestic determinants of trade negotiation outcomes. Second, the policy proposals can be extended to other countries’ cases with a minor adjustment. Finally, the analysis is based on the assumption that international trade negotiations are multi-level frameworks where domestic influences play a vital role in the aftermath of bilateral FTAs.