Abstract
Abstract Ecological compensation is an effective way to alleviate watershed water ecological management. Considering the behavior of public participation, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of the public, enterprises, and local governments, analyzes the evolutionary stability of the strategic choice of each participant, and discusses the influence of various factors on the strategic choice of the three parties. Combined with regional data, Matlab R2018b is used to simulate and analyze the evolution trend of each subject strategy in the Huaihe River Basin under different situations. The study found that: (1) The government's increase in rewards and punishments has significantly promoted public participation and enterprises' active governance of pollution, but increasing rewards and punishments are not conducive to local governments' own performance of regulatory responsibilities. (2) Increasing the amount of compensation and incentives is an effective way to promote public participation. (3) The sum of reputation gains, reputation losses, and rewards and punishments is greater than the difference between the additional benefits of negative governance and the cost of corporate governance, so as to ensure that enterprises actively control pollution.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
More From: AQUA — Water Infrastructure, Ecosystems and Society
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.