Abstract
Based on the perspective of precision poverty alleviation, this article uses a large number of literature studies, combined with field investigations in Tieshan Town, Zhenghe County, Fujian Province, and uses game theory to construct a three-party game model between the government, enterprises, and poor households to study the willingness and interest relationship of the three to implement precision poverty alleviation. After summarizing the different consideration points of each subject, this article discusses the effects of China’s targeted poverty alleviation policies and the problems that exist.
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