Research on the synergy mechanism of multiple subjects in global climate governance: Based on the perspective of the evolutionary game of carbon neutral strategy between China, the US, and the EU

Abstract

It is difficult to achieve ideal results only based on a single subject for governing global climate issues, and the synergy co-governance of multiple subjects may address this difficulty. Based on the different resource advantages and interests of China, the US, and the EU, the roles they assume and play in the governance of global climate issues are different. In this study, we explore the competition and interaction between the carbon neutral strategies of China, the US, and the EU under different scenarios through the dynamic evolution game model and use simulation analysis to simulate the impact of changes in the initial values of the main parameters on the evolution trend of the three-party game strategy under a variety of scenarios, in order to explore the dynamic evolution path of the behavior of the three parties in the game and the stabilization strategy. The result of this study suggests that: (1) The strategic choices of different participants in global climate governance interact with each other. (2) The ideal strategy combination may be achieved when the carbon neutral strategy game is carried out between China, the US, and the EU under certain conditions. (3) If the initial willingness to cooperate changes, with the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) unchanged, only the convergence rate of the evolutionary game subject's strategy choices will be affected. (4) The result of the sensitivity analysis suggests that certain policy conflicts exist in the evolution process of carbon neutrality strategies in China, the US, and the EU. Besides, the evolution path will deviate from the ideal state with the change in the benefits of different entities. The conclusion of this study can provide a valuable reference for China, the US, and the EU to divide responsibilities and form a consensus in the synergy governance mechanism, such that the effectiveness of global climate governance can be increased.