Abstract

The Articles of Agreement on the New Development Bank is not only the Charter of the New Development Bank of the BRICs, but also a new rule of global financial governance. Its internal governance rules resemble its skeleton, supporting the decision-making and operation of the entire New Development Bank. On the basis of drawing lessons from the agreements of the existing international development financial institutions, there are many innovative practices in the internal governance rules of the New Development Bank. However, at the beginning, there are still some imperfections in the internal governance of the new development bank. Its legitimacy, accountability, and beneficial coordination among the three are outstanding, which are mainly manifested in: First, the New Development Bank has established a basic internal organizational structure of the board of directors, board of governors and presidents.Second, the lack of representativeness of directors, presidents and vice presidents weakens the legitimacy of the bank. Third, the rotation system of the president of BRICS countries affects the bank’s aid continuation of policy. Fourth, the voting mechanism of equal rights in the five countries reduces the efficiency of the bank, and the two-state veto system has led to a lack of leaders in decision-making rules.Under the current post-epidemic background, the New Development Bank, as the first global development financial institution established by developing countries, is playing an active role by providing emergency assistance loans and other means, especially the economic recovery of emerging market countries. In view of this, it is necessary to make a systematic and innovation analysis on the internal governance of the New Development Bank. The regulation of the internal governance of the New Development Bank should be carried out from the following aspects: First, to establish a coordinating supervisory agency, strengthen the coordination, supervision and mutual restriction of the existing mechanism of the New Development Bank, and implement a director system combining non-resident and resident directors. Second, to improve the representativeness of directors and presidents, and establish the election system of rotating presidents and the procedure of no-confidence cases. It includes optimizing the composition of rotating presidents, extending the period of rotation, establishing the procedure for no-confidence motions against rotating presidents, and adjusting the automatic rotation system for rotating presidents. Finally, to establish a more reasonable voting mechanism that weights basic voting rights and equity voting rights and an interest compensation mechanism of non-founding countries that replaces voting rights with interests.

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