Abstract
The implementation of low-carbon development and carbon reduction has become an issue of general concern. When local governments adopt carbon reduction measures, they inevitably have a negative impact on the economic development of enterprises and the daily lives of residents. However, the resolution of conflicts of interest between local governments, enterprises, and residents will have a direct impact on the motivation and effectiveness of local governments in implementing carbon reduction measures. This study takes China as an example, conducts a case review of the actual situation of the Zhejiang power restriction incident, and studies and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the local government, enterprises, and residents. By exploring the factors that influence the behavioral strategies of each stakeholder, this study finds the equilibrium conditions that the tripartite governance target model must satisfy. It is suggested that interactive feedback from enterprises and residents should be incorporated into the performance management of local governments and that performance assessment should be used to establish an effective responsibility and pressure transmission mechanism to help the government’s internal control to better implement carbon reduction policies.
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