Abstract
This paper makes an in-depth analysis of the characteristics, the motivation and the intervention effect of government intervention in executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The research shows that the local government always makes and implements differentiated compensation regulation policies according to the marketization degree, the income gap, the financial deficit level, the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate. However, from the perspective of intervention effect, such government intervention in executive compensation weakens the compensation performance sensitivity of SOEs executives, effects the future performance of Chinese SOEs, and it has a greater negative impact on competitive SOEs. The conclusion indicates that the government should improve the pertinence and validity of government behavior and try to establish differentiated executive’s compensation incentive mechanism that matches the governance behavior of modern SOEs with Chinese characteristics.
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