Research on the Mechanism of the Impact of M&A Motivation on M&A Performance

Abstract

Under China’s financial supervision system, the financial industry gradually tries to merge and acquire in order to achieve the strategic goal of industrial integration and economic transformation, and maintain a state of continuous rising profitability. M&A, as an important means to reallocate resources in the capital market, has a far-reaching impact on enterprises and is also a hot issue in the field of corporate finance research in recent years. Because of the complexity of M&A activities, the identification of M&A motives is particularly important for the study of M&A performance and related issues. However, the previous research lacks a systematic study of M&A motivation and its influence on M&A performance from the perspective of “agent”. Therefore, based on the existing M&A theories and the actual situation in China, this article studies the relationship between managers’ agent M&A motivation and M&A performance from the perspective of “agents”. This article innovatively introduces a compensation mechanism to study the impact of agent M&A motivation on M&A performance, which can obtain whether agent M&A motivation damages corporate value, and can also understand whether executives seek private benefits through M&A, providing evidence for the agent motivation hypothesis from multiple perspectives.