Abstract
In order to ensure stable cooperation among the government, enterprise and university/institute in the green technology innovation process and guide an increasing number of innovation agents in the region to adopt cooperation, this paper studies the mechanism of green technology innovation. A tripartite evolutionary game model is established and the strategy choices of the government, industry and university/institute are analyzed through mathematical derivation. On this basis, the cellular automata theory is used to explore strategy choices of all innovation agents in the region from the perspective of a spatial game. From the numerical tests, the following results are obtained: increasing the cooperative innovation revenue, fairness of this revenue distribution or penalties for breach of contract can consolidate the cooperative relationship among the government, enterprise and university/institute, achieving the goal of guiding all innovation agents in the region to accept the collaborative innovation mode; regulating the government subsidy or government penalty can consolidate the cooperative relationship among participants in the pilot project, but cannot guide all innovation agents in the region accept the collaboration innovation mode. This paper’s results not only enrich the theory of government–industry–university–institute collaborative innovation in green technology, but provide ideas for stable cooperation mechanisms and comprehensive promotion of this collaborative innovation mode as well.
Highlights
An increasing number of countries actively formulate and implement green development plans, because limited resources and the pressure of the environment have been holding back their economic development [1–3]
This paper mainly studies the following questions: (1) what factors have an impact on the evolution of green technology innovation? (2) how can these factors be controlled or adjusted to ensure stable cooperation among the government, an enterprise and a university/institute in the green technology innovation process? (3) how can these factors be controlled to guide an increasing number of innovation agents in the region to adopt cooperation strategies?
In order to clearly and intuitively describe the dynamic evolution behaviors of the government, enterprise and university/institute in the process of green technology innovation, a numerical simulation analysis was used to discuss the influences of the values of the cost–benefit variable, equitable distribution variable, external incentive variable and penalty variables on the stability of the evolutionary game model and the regional promotion of the government–industry–university–institute collaborative innovation mode
Summary
An increasing number of countries actively formulate and implement green development plans, because limited resources and the pressure of the environment have been holding back their economic development [1–3]. Since green technology innovation can promote the transformation of industrial development modes and improve resource utilization efficiency, it has become the driving force for achieving green development. Enterprises, the principal party of green technology innovation, bear the responsibility of leading green development with technological innovation for a long time. That green technology is conductive to the improvement of economic, environmental and social performance leads enterprises to take the initiative in carrying out green technology innovation [4,5]. Enterprises have to adopt green technology innovation because of consumers’ green awareness increasing and the environmental regulation of the government becoming stricter [6]. It can be seen that green technology innovation is the development trend and essential way for enterprises
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