Abstract
Abstract In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.
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