Abstract
The paper established cournot duopoly competition model with price’s co-opetition, introduced degree of willingness to cooperate, and analyzed the impact of price’s co-opetition on the degree of willingness to cooperate. the overall profit and individual differences are compared under two cases which are both partial cooperation, one partial cooperation and the other betrayal, revealing the characteristics of decision-making behavior. as co excess profits do not represent the individual's excess profits, betrayal is the optimal choice. reasonably efficient profits allocation mechanisms and contractual constraints, are the condition of oligopolistic stable cooperation.
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