Abstract
Using a Stackelberg game model, this research examines the impact of government-imposed carbon taxes on the sustainability of a two-echelon supply chain. The analysis focuses on the interactions between upstream suppliers and downstream manufacturers, taking into account how manufacturers’ carbon emissions influence market demand, as well as how sustainability levels and price affect this demand. The results show that a centralized system has a lesser potential for total profit development in the supply chain than a decentralized system. To encourage investment in green technologies throughout the supply chain, this paper proposes two coordination mechanisms: a green subsidy and a two-part tariff contract. Numerical study reveals that a win–win scenario for the supply chain requires suppliers to share part of the costs. Furthermore, under a two-part tariff contract, successfully managing fixed costs can result in total profit levels comparable to those in a centralized system. The research also makes strategy recommendations, such as differentiating carbon levies, improving supply chain coordination, and assessing fixed costs. These aim to provide theoretical and practical implications for supply chain management in order to assist businesses and policymakers in effectively responding to the problems of climate change.
Published Version
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