Research on the evolution mechanism of promoting clean power supply under the background of rural energy reform in China

Abstract

In the process of promoting China’s rural energy reform, there will be a power gap problem, and the power companies will reduce the policy effect in disguise from their interests. To promote clean power supply in rural areas, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between electric power companies and solar investment companies under the background of energy reform in rural areas, systematically deduces the possible different strategy combinations of both parties, and uses real data to conduct simulation and parameter sensitivity analysis. The results show that: (1) Under the current market mechanism, the system will evolve into (0,0), and there may be four different strategy combinations when government regulation is introduced. (2) Under the condition that the system evolves into the optimal state in the initial state, the local government’s subsidy to the investment company is no less than ¥0.11/kW h, and the penalty to the power company is ¥0.18/ kW h. (3) Compared with power companies, investment companies are more sensitive to government subsidies, so it is suggested that the government pay more attention to subsidies to investment companies. This study can provide theoretical support and policy references for promoting rural energy reform.