Research on Teamwork Mechanism and Teamwork Efficiency from the Perspective of Fairness Preference

Abstract

Traditional teamwork theories are widely applied in relevant researches and practices, but they are based on the hypothesis that human beings are selfish. However, emerging behavioral economics has well proved that human beings have fairness preference. New theories based on that are coming into being gradually, and possess significant implications for a wide scope of researches. By applying the fairness preference theory, this thesis researches the teamwork theory and the efficiency of teamwork with agents of fairness preference under the condition of budget constraints. This thesis also analyzes the influence mechanism of fairness preference on teamwork. Analysis shows that under the condition of budget constraints, agent's fairness preferences can not lead team cooperation to the Pareto optimal level of efficiency. But when the agent has the appropriate fairness preferences, the agent's moral hazard problem can be allayed, thereby enabling Pareto efficiency improvement in teamwork. Otherwise, the agent's moral hazard problem will be worse. This research not only shows how the agent's preferences affect teamwork and its efficiency, but also covers the researches done with the traditional teamwork theory in this field and thus improves its generality. Conclusions from this research would provide theoretical guidance and enlightenment for the rational use of agents' fairness preference to improve the efficiency of team production.