Research on supply chain contract design under information-sharing

Abstract

In this paper, a two-stage supply chain was used as the object to analyze the changes of supply chain efficiency and effectiveness before and after information sharing, while the influence of the shortage cost was considered. Based on cooperative game of the two sides after information sharing, the supply chain contract systems and its contract parameter design models were provided for enterprises to practice easily. This study shows that after information sharing, the supplier can use supply chain contracts to improve the supply chain efficiency and effectiveness, and increase the profits of the partners; if the two sides share the inventory risk costs, the combinations of the inventory transfer price and the inventory risk cost coefficient shared by the supplier must satisfy a condition to ensure that the profit combination of the supply chain is a Pareto improvement; if the two sides share the costs and profits, the supplier can use the Rubinstein model to determine the profit sharing coefficient, and improve the efficiency of contract design.