Research on Sharing Behavior Strategy of Cultural Heritage Institutions Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

With the accelerated digitalization of China’s cultural heritage conservation, cultural heritage data sharing has been gaining more and more attention as an essential link in cultural heritage conservation and transmission. However, there are many problems in cultural heritage sharing, one of which is the low willingness of institutions to share among themselves and the seriousness of information silos. To motivate more cultural heritage institutions to participate in platform sharing and promote long-term, stable data sharing behavior, the dynamic evolution process and the law of institutions’ sharing behavior in cultural heritage sharing platforms must be further studied. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory to explore the evolutionary paths of finite rational cultural heritage institutions to reach a stable strategy, discusses the relevant factors affecting these evolutionary paths, and conducts simulation experiments with the help of MATLAB. This paper finds that the sharing behavior of institutions in cultural heritage sharing platforms is affected by the initial state over time. The free-riding penalty of non-sharing parties, the coefficient of synergistic benefit, the data sharing volume, and the proportion of data complementarity have positive effects on the sharing behavior of cultural heritage institutions; meanwhile, the fixed sharing costs and the loss of gains of sharing parties have an adverse impact on the sharing behavior of cultural heritage institutions. The findings of this paper are essential for solving the cultural heritage sharing dilemma, improving the competitiveness of cultural heritage institutions, and promoting the sustainable development of cultural heritage sharing platforms, which can help promote the development of cultural heritage and help the implementation of cultural digitalization strategies.