Research on power battery recycling mode selection considering dual behavioral preferences under different government subsidies

Abstract

Abstract Efficient and stable recycling of power batteries requires the construction of a perfect and reasonable recycling system; the current research however fails to take into account the comprehensive influence of government policies outside the supply chain and internal members’ behavioral preferences at the same time, hence fail to reflect the whole and true recycling reality. This paper studies how different battery recycling subsidy policies and relevant players’ behavioral preferences affect decision-making along the supply chain and tries to work out the optimal power battery recycling model. The results show that (1) Which recycling subsidy policy is better at promoting battery recycling is related to the size of battery capacity; (2) Behavioral preferences of key players, i.e. the risk aversion of the battery manufacturer and the fairness concern preference of the vehicle manufacturer, can be irrelevant or have a negative impact on power battery recycling; (3) The preferred recycling models vary among key stakeholders in the recycling ecosystem. The government encourages battery producers to lead the recycling operation, consumers and battery producers check the risk sensitivity, and vehicle manufacturers prefer to recycle batteries alone.