Research on investment optimization and coordination of fresh supply chain considering misreporting behavior under blockchain technology

Abstract

In the traditional fresh supply chain, farmers commonly conceal the true quality information of their products in order to achieve better sales. This article focuses on the use of blockchain technology to address the issue of false freshness reporting in a two-level fresh supply chain consisting of a rural cooperative and a supermarket. Taking into account the dual losses of quality and quantity in the process of agricultural products transportation, the impacts of the product freshness and the blockchain investment level on random market demand are quantified in this paper. And game models for centralized and decentralized decision-making before and after investing in blockchain technology are proposed. By comparing the supply chain optimal decisions and performances under different scenarios, a revenue-cost sharing contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making. Simulation results show that the application of the blockchain technology can further consolidate the superiority of the centralized decision-making. However, there is a certain threshold for the application of the blockchain technology in decentralized decision-making. When the unit cost of blockchain exceeds the threshold, the rural cooperative will abandon its cooperation with the supermarket due to reduced profits. And the combined contract also has a threshold boundary for its coordinating effect on decentralized decision-making.