Research on investment incorporating both environmental performance and long (short) term financial performance of firms

Abstract

Firstly, with the rapid popularisation of the ESG concept and the deepening of the conception of green and low-carbon development, the performance of a firm in protecting and improving the ecological environment and the level of green technology investment has gradually become the reference criteria for judging whether the firm has social value and sustainability in development. Secondly, to pursue short-term survival and long-term development, the firm will also vigorously strive for short-term profit creation and long-term capital accumulation. Thirdly, due to the existence of information asymmetry, the principal-agent parties in a firm may generate agency conflicts in the pursuit of maximising their own interests, which may lead to losses or even bankruptcy. Therefore, making rational short-term, long-term, and green technology investment decisions that consider both characteristics of firm and agency conflicts is essential for the survival and sustainable development of the firm. From the perspective of contract theory, this paper considers the design of an optimal dynamic financial contract that considers the environment's improvement and the achievement of the firm's long- and short-term financial performance while satisfying incentive compatibility. On this basis, we explore how the optimal investment strategies vary with firm characteristics. The results of the study suggest that the decisions of green technology investment, short-term investment, and long-term capital investment should be appropriately adjusted according to the level of financial slack and the effect of different market shocks to facilitate the achievement of the dual objectives of long- and short-term profitability and environmental improvement.