Abstract

Due to the significant characteristics of decentralization and tamper resistance of blockchain technology, it helps to solve the problems of timeliness and slow permission control in traditional information sharing. However, most researchers are committed to exploring how to improve the efficiency, reliability, and privacy security of digital twin data. There is a lack of research on issues such as blockchain participants free-riding and not actively participating in information sharing, and how to promote information sharing through incentives. Therefore, this paper designs a distance grouping based practical byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithm to address the credibility issue of transmitted data, thereby improving the efficiency of negotiation. The feasibility of the algorithm is verified through cases analysis. In addition, for the problem of low subjective willingness of information sharing, this paper designs an information sharing incentive strategy based on blockchain intelligent contracts, establishes digital twin data sharing evolutionary game models with reputation incentives and non-reputation incentives, so as to explore the impact of reputation incentive on evolutionary stability strategies. Finally, simulation analysis is conducted on the evolutionary game model of digital twin data sharing. The impact of several key indicators such as data complementarity, trust, positive incentive coefficient, and data sharing cost on the evolution process of information sharing are considered, and corresponding management insights are obtained.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call