Abstract
The Yellow River Basin is an important ecological function zone in China, and it plays an important role in the national economic and social development pattern. However, the over-utilization of water resources has made the ecological and environmental problems in the river basin more and more serious. For this reason, the coordinated governance of the areas along the Yellow River basin has become very important. Based on the static game model, this paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of the coordinated governance of the Yellow River basin in the upstream and downstream areas, constructs a static game model of ecological compensation between the Shanxi and Henan governments under coordinated governance, and studies the feedback equilibrium strategies of the Shanxi and Henan governments. This article provides theoretical basis and suggestions for collaborative governance to achieve sustainable development. The game results show that: reducing the cost of protecting the ecological environment of the upstream basin, increasing the benefits of protecting the ecological environment, and increasing the amount of ecological compensation can promote the implementation of the ecological compensation policy between the upstream and downstream in the basin.
Highlights
In September 2019, the "Yellow River Basin Ecological Protection and High-quality Development Symposium" was successfully held in Zhengzhou, Henan
It is assumed that the original income obtained by the upstream Pinglu County when adopting the nonprotection strategy is R; E is the additional net benefit obtained from the improvement of the ecological environment of the Yellow River Basin when the upstream chooses the protection strategy; C is the total cost paid by the upstream when choosing a protection strategy; L is the amount of ecological compensation paid by the downstream to the upstream; G is the original income of the downstream Sanmenxia area when the upstream Pinglu County chooses the non-protection strategy; T is the additional benefit that the downstream obtains due to the improvement of the ecological environment of the river basin when the upstream chooses the protection strategy
(1) As the ecological compensation in the Yellow River Basin lacks a strong long-term supervision mechanism, when the benefits of protecting the ecological environment of the upstream basin are greater than the cost paid, regardless of whether the downstream provides certain ecological compensation to the upstream, the upstream will insist on protecting the ecological environment of the basin. the game between the Shanxi and Henan governments will fall into a “vicious circle”, and the ecological environment in the basin will be trapped in a vicious circle
Summary
In September 2019, the "Yellow River Basin Ecological Protection and High-quality Development Symposium" was successfully held in Zhengzhou, Henan. Since the water of the Yellow River flows uninterruptedly, the Yellow River Basin has formed an asymmetrical distribution among the regions along the coast This has caused the disadvantages of the mutual transfer of costs and benefits between the upper and lower reaches of the Yellow River in the areas of ecological environment management and water resources development[1]. In this case, if the upstream Pinglu County area is active in protecting the watershed, the downstream Sanmenxia area can get positive ecological externalities from it without paying, but the upstream area cannot automatically get economic benefits and compensation from it, there will be a "free-riding" phenomenon of "upstream areas invest, and downstream areas only benefit but not invest." The upstream areas are very reluctant to invest in such "public welfare undertakings"
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